The Iranian nuclear program

... Hmm... Now why on Earth would Iran be interested in nuclear weapons...?

The recently unveiled nuclear plant near the city of Qom has thrust the Iranian nuclear program back into the spotlight. At the recent G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, the US, Britain and France joined in denouncing the facility, and in calling for further sanctions. Just days later, Iran tested missiles said to be capable of striking Israel. This Al Jazeera documentary does a good job of setting out the dangers and foreboding complexities that beset this situation even before it was compounded by these developments. Iran claims to have an inalienable right to nuclear energy, but the West accuses them of "breaking [international] rules". Who, if anyone, is in the right? Is Iran trying to acquire nuclear weapons? And if so, what can be done about it?

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First of all, it is important to note that nobody can really accuse Tehran of being in direct violation of anything concrete;"breaking rules" in this case really just means "making us powerful nations unhappy". The IAEA is undermined by the fact that it is guided by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT is undermined by the fact that the obligations of the pre-existing nuclear powers include "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Article VI). The US (even under the current leadership) and others blatantly ignore these obligations. They also selectively apply the rules to other countries: witness China's reluctance to apply sanctions to Iran; and the respective American reactions to the nuclear programs on either side of the Korean demilitarized zone. The NPT is a relic of the cold war, a time when most countries were effectively restrained by their US or Soviet "allies" in terms of nuclear ambitions in any case. It was not designed to regulate clandestine programs. Attempts to compensate for this deficiency by regulating sensitive materials endanger the Third Pillar of the NPT: all non-nuclear signatories (that includes Iran) are entitled to assistance in developing civilian nuclear energy programs, provided they can demonstrate a purely peaceful intent. (This apparently low hurtle is prohibitive in Iran's case, for reasons I discuss below). This is the basis of Iran's proclaimed right to nuclear energy.

Unfortunately again for the credibility of the NPT, three nuclear-armed states, India, Pakistan and Israel have neglected to sign, let alone ratify it. Of course, none of this stops the NPT from being the single most important international agreement on the control of proliferation. So what can reasonably be done to dissuade aspiring "nuclear club" members?

Proliferation tends to occur in countries that feel threatened and insecure: the US acquired nukes to beat back Japan; Russia soon countered; Britain got them after the post-WWII American elections once again handed power to isolationists; France after the Suez Canal Crisis forced them to re-evaluate their own relationship with the US; China after having Eisenhower wave nukes in their face; India after losing a war with China; Pakistan after losing a war with India; South Africa after neighbouring Angola and Mozambique gained independence from Portugal; Brazil and Argentina in a South American arm race, and so on. Nuclear programs divert vast capital from other potentially rewarding endeavors; the best way to predict whether or not a country will produce nuclear weapons is to perceive whether or not that country has the resources and feels it needs them to properly defend itself and its interests.

In the 1980's, Iran fought a long bitter war with Iraq, during which millions were killed on either side. No clear winner emerged from this decade-long conflict. Then, in 2003, Iran watched as America swept Iraqi opposition aside in a matter of weeks during the "Shock and Awe" campaign. You can bet the lesson was taken to heart: Tehran would be foolish to assume the same thing could never happen to them. They are almost completely encircled by a hostile, and vastly superior military force and it's allies. In addition, Iran's arch-nemesis, Israel, represents an immediate and implacable nuclear-capable foe. These facts provide, in my opinion, the best evidence available that Iran will pursue a nuclear weapons program; it makes perfect sense that they would do so. Even if Persia were ruled by the Care Bears, they could not conceivably demonstrate peaceful intent under these circumstances. So they must effectively give up any hope of enriching uranium in order to escape suspicion. Iran seems uninterested in entertaining this option just yet.

Are sanctions are an effective way to discourage Iranian aspirations? The ones already in place don't seem to have "worked". Further sanctions might prove productive, but they also risk enhancing the Iranian regime's sense of isolation, and lead them to place greater - not less -emphasis on defense. Any impact they have on Iranian cost-benefit estimations is only going to occur in the long run, and even then are likely to be largely blunted by national pride; a sense of unfair treatment at the hands of the "international community"; and the half-hearted participation of China and Russia. What really has to take place is a general diffusion of regional tensions. But the situations in Palestine, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan are all at play here, and I don't expect immediate, permanent and complete resolutions to these all these problems to suddenly occur to anyone anytime soon. So despite the drawbacks, and almost certain futility, alternatives to sanctions are in short supply.

There are two obvious alternatives, of course: one is simply taking no action, and allowing Iran to do its thing; the other is military action. But as this rather sobering report by Jamal Dajani suggests, these two options may not turn out to be as distinct as they might sound.